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Some of the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Ownership
Concentration in Canada
Abstract
The June 1997 edition of Canadian Business ranks the top ten Canadian corporations in terms of growth. It
states of its number-one performer, the Goldfarb Corporation, "Goldfarb's expansion strategy is founded on a
few basic principles: First, look to invest in global companies.... Second, own more than 50% of the company in
order to consolidate and control the business. Last, use Goldfarb's own marketing expertise." It states of its
number-three performer, on the other hand, "Question: What turns a $395-million pipeline company into a
$2.5 billion powerhouse in just three years? Answer: losing the majority shareholder. Ever since Olympia and
York Developments Ltd. sold its 65% stake in IPL Energy Inc. of Calgary in 1992, IPL has grown with a
vengeance. Instead of maximizing dividend payouts to satisfy cash-hungry O&Y, it has focused on expansion"
("Performance 500, Top 10" 1997, 137, 141; emphasis added). Mere pages apart, the magazine partially
credits majority ownership with driving a successful company and blames majority ownership for restraining
the performance of a potentially successful company. As this paper will discuss, there may be some truth to
both opinions.
At least since the time of Adam Smith, commentators have expressed concern about the effect of separating
those who own a corporation from those who manage it, an effect resulting from the adoption of a widely held
ownership structure (Smith 1937, 700; Berle and Means 1933). The suggested problem is that, if those who
manage do not have a personal interest in the returns generated by the firm's assets, those assets will be
utilized in a way that may be beneficial to the manager but not to the owners.
Berle and Means (1933), however, were more pessimistic, predicting not only that corporations not owned by
their managers would underperform corporations owned by managers but also that these widely held
corporations would eventually become the norm in developing industrial economies. The argument was
simple. As an economy grows and firms strive for scale economies, entrepreneur-managers are not capable of
raising money to finance the firm's growth on their own and thus are compelled to go to equity markets to
finance expansion. In repeatedly going to equity markets, of course, the entrepreneur eventually loses control
of the firm. Because of the unceasing demand for capital in a rapidly industrializing society, the economy will
in time largely comprise widely held corporations, which, given their inadequate governance by disinterested
managers, does not bode well for the efficiency of the economy.
It is apparent, however, that Berle and Means overstated the likelihood of an economy replete with widely
held firms. While the widely held corporation is indeed the norm in the United States, firms controlled by
very few shareholders remain predominant in other industrialized countries, such as Germany, Japan, and
Canada. In Canada, for example, Morck and Stangeland (1994) report that just under 16 percent of the 550
largest corporations in Canada in 1989 were widely held in the sense that no single shareholder owned more
than 20 percent of outstanding voting stock. Using the same definition, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) had found
earlier that almost 50 percent of the largest 511 corporations in the United States were widely held.
We first provide. a brief outline of the literature on corporate governance and ownership concentration. l Next,
we examine legal issues that, as a positive matter, may have contributed to the concentrated ownership
structure in Canada. We then examine the normative implications of these causal relations.
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The June 1997 edition of Canadian Business ranks the top ten Canadian
corporations in terms of growth. It states of its number-one performer,
the Goldfarb Corporation, "Goldfarb's expansion strategy is founded on
a few basic principles: First, look to invest in global companies.... Sec-
ond, own more than 50% of the company in order to consolidate and control
the business. Last, use Goldfarb's own marketing expertise." It states of
its number-three performer, on the other hand, "Question: What turns a
$395-million pipeline company into a $2.5 billion powerhouse in just three
years? Answer: losing the majority shareholder. Ever since Olympia and
York Developments Ltd. sold its 65% stake in IPL Energy Inc. of Calgary
in 1992, IPL has grown with a vengeance. Instead of maximizing dividend
payouts to satisfy cash-hungry O&Y, it has focused on expansion" ("Per-
formance 500, Top 10" 1997, 137, 141; emphasis added). Mere pages apart,
the magazine partially credits majority ownership with driving a success-
ful company and blames majority ownership for restraining the perfor-
mance of a potentially successful company. As this paper will discuss,
there may be some truth to both opinions.
At least since the time of Adam Smith, commentators have expressed
concern about the effect of separating those who own a corporation from
those who manage it, an effect resulting from the adoption of a widely
held ownership structure (Smith 1937, 700; Berle and Means 1933). The
suggested problem is that, if those who manage do not have a personal
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interest in the returns generated by the firm's assets, those assets will be
utilized in a way that may be beneficial to the manager but not to the
owners.
Berle and Means (1933), however, were more pessimistic, predicting not
only that corporations not owned by their managers would underperform
corporations owned by managers but also that these widely held corpora-
tions would eventually become the norm in developing industrial econo-
mies. The argument was simple. As an economy grows and firms strive for
scale economies, entrepreneur-managers are not capable of raising money
to finance the firm's growth on their own and thus are compelled to go to
equity markets to finance expansion. In repeatedly going to equity mar-
kets, of course, the entrepreneur eventually loses control of the firm. Be-
cause of the unceasing demand for capital in a rapidly industrializing soci-
ety, the economy will in time largely comprise widely held corporations,
which, given their inadequate governance by disinterested managers, does
not bode well for the efficiency of the economy.
It is apparent, however, that Berle and Means overstated the likelihood
of an economy replete with widely held firms. While the widely held corpo-
ration is indeed the norm in the United States, firms controlled by very
few shareholders remain predominant in other industrialized countries,
such as Germany, Japan, and Canada. In Canada, for example, Morck
and Stangeland (1994) report that just under 16 percent of the 550 largest
corporations in Canada in 1989 were widely held in the sense that no single
shareholder owned more than 20 percent of outstanding voting stock. Us-
ing the same definition, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) had found earlier that
almost 50 percent of the largest 511 corporations in the United States were
widely held.
We first provide. a brief outline of the literature on corporate governance
and ownership concentration. l Next, we examine legal issues that, as a posi-
tive matter, may have contributed to the concentrated ownership structure
in Canada. We then examine the normative implications of these causal
relations.
3.1 Concentration of Ownership and Corporate Governance
3.1.1 Problems with the Widely Held Corporation
The fundamental concern about the widely held corporation is that,
since the manager has only an attenuated interest in the profits generated
by the firm, she will act not to maximize those profits but rather to max-
imize her own private utility. The manager may not work hard (she may
"shirk"), may divert corporate resources to herself (perhaps by overcon-
1. Much of the outline draws on Daniels and Halpern (1996).
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suming material perquisites), or may otherwise invest corporate resources
poorly (perhaps by investing to avoid risky undertakings that, even though
they may be profitable, may endanger the risk-averse manager's job).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally developed a theory of the firm
based on Berle and Means's (1933) concern about the separation of owner-
ship and control. Clearly, one way to reduce the conflicts of interest be-
tween the shareholders and the managers-conflicts that lead to agency
costs-is to increase the proportion of shares in the firm held by the man-
ager. As the manager's interest in the firm's performance increases because
of his increased shareholding, he is less likely to manage the corporation
suboptimally. Other sources of disciplinary control over managers include
takeovers and the market for corporate control (Manne 1965), executive
compensation, product market discipline (Hart 1983), the managerial la-
bor market (Fama 1980), and such outside stakeholders as creditors. 2 Fi-
nally, by establishing disclosure obligations or fiduciary duties, the law it-
self may exert pressure on managers.
3.1.2 Problems with Concentrated Ownership
If the only agency concern relevant to corporate governance were the
divergence of interest between managers and nonmanagerial shareholders,
an increase in managerial ownership would be an unambiguous boon to
corporate efficiency. As the divergence in interest between managers and
share owners is reduced, agency costs are reduced. As more recent schol-
arship has suggested, however, as ownership becomes more concentrated,
countervailing pressures indicate that an overall reduction of agency costs
will not necessarily result.
A manager will engage in undesirable agency behavior if the private
benefits exceed the private costs of doing so. Increased concentration of
ownership may lower the private costs of undesirable agency behavior,
thus perhaps increasing the likelihood of managerial self-indulgence. The
private costs of managerial diversion include the opportunity costs to the
manager resulting from the suboptimal use of corporate resources, costs
that increase as managerial ownership of the firm increases. This is Jen-
sen and Meckling's (1976) line of argument. However, private costs also
comprise any disciplinary costs that result from suboptimal management.
These disciplinary costs will likely decrease as ownership increases, for
two principal reasons related to the entrenchment of the controlling share-
holder. First, as equity control increases, the controlling shareholder exerts
greater control over the board of directors, thus increasing the likelihood
of translation of its wishes into action and reducing the likelihood of disci-
2. For an overview of the issues related to executive compensation, see Iacobucci and
Trebilcock (1996). For an overview of the relation between corporate governance and debt,
see Triantis (1996) and Triantis and Daniels (1995).
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pline from the board. Second, sources of discipline other than ownership,
such as the market for corporate control (Stu1z 1988), may be attenuated
by increased managerial ownership.3 If the private costs of managerial se1f-
indulgence fall as ownership concentration rises, increased concentration
may encourage agency problems between the controlling shareho1der(s)
and the minority shareholders.
3.1.3 Evidence of Ownership Concentration and Performance
While a complete survey is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to
say that the ambiguity of the theory of the effects of increased concentra-
tion is reflected in the empirical evidence.4 Some studies have shown a
curvilinear relation between concentration and ownership: as ownership
concentration rises from very low levels, firm performance improves, but,
as ownership continues to rise, firm performance falls off. s Other studies
have indicated that the effect of concentration of share ownership on firm
performance is negligib1e.6 Still others have found a significant negative
correlation between performance and concentrated ownership.7
3.2 The Determinants of Concentrated Ownership
Commentators have offered a variety of suggestions about the determi-
nants of ownership concentration. Some have theorized that the economic
nature of the particular firm may be a significant factor in determining
ownership concentration. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) contend
3. In Canada, where corporate shareholding concentration is high, there is empirical sup-
port for the claim that concentrated ownership reduces the likelihood of a hostile takeover.
Of the 1,148 Canadian merger-and-acquisition transactions in the Venture database in 1989,
only 7 resulted in management resistance or in the making of a competitive bid (Daniels and
MacIntosh 1991, 889).
4. For a more complete survey of recent empirical studies, see Daniels and Halpern (1996).
5. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), e.g., found that, as concentration continues to rise
to very high levels, firm performance (as measured by Tobin's Q) eventually improves. An
explanation for this result is that, once entrenchment is complete, increased ownership serves
only to better align managerial and shareholder interests.
6. See, e.g., Jog and Tulpule (1996). Rao and Lee-Sing (1996) found that corporate concen-
tration and performance were not correlated in Canada but that a weak, negative correlation
existed in the United States. MacIntosh and Schwartz (1996) found ambiguous evidence:
firms that had controlling shareholders had higher returns on assets and equity, no discern-
ible effect on sales growth, and lower price-to-book ratios. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found
no correlation between concentrated managerial ownership and financial performance.
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that performance as measured by Tobin's Q did not
differ significantly between a sample of firms with a shareholder holding between 50 and 95
percent of equity and a matched sample of firms with diffuse holdings. They did find, how-
ever, that, if the control block was held by an individual as opposed to a corporation, perfor-
mance as measured by Tobin's Qwas lower than that of firms in the control group, although
the difference was not significant.
7. Slovin and Sushka (1993), e.g., found that, when a CEO or founder with a significant
shareholding died, there was, on average, a positive, abnormal return, a result consistent
with entrenchment.
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that share ownership concentration is positively related to the volatility of
a firm's cash flow and the size of the firm. As cash-flow volatility rises,
outside monitors cannot discern whether the managers or outside factors
have determined firm performance. Inside monitoring by large sharehold-
ers attenuates this problem and reduces agency costs accordingly. As firm
size increases, Demsetz and Lehn also argue, the price of a given fraction
of equity rises, which reduces ownership concentration. While these and
other factors may indeed be important in determining the structure of
ownership, in this section we review various aspects of the Canadian legal
regime that may help explain the concentrated nature of corporate owner-
ship in that country. While we do not engage in rigorous testing of the
hypotheses, we note some relevant empirical evidence.
3.2.1 Restrictions on Investment by Financial Intermediaries
Roe offers a political theory explaining concentration levels in the
United States (Roe 1991, 1994). He suggests that political pressure from
interest groups, such as small banks, combined with a general distrust of
concentrated economic power, gave rise in the United States to laws de-
signed to diminish the ability of large capital pools to invest in the equity
of American corporations. Concentrated corporate ownership was corre-
spondingly diminished: those entities controlling asset pools large enough
to obtain control of corporations were legally prevented from doing so.
Berle and Means's vision of an economy controlled by widely held firms
emerged, not as an inevitable result of the economy's growth and eco-
nomic forces, but as the result of political populism.
If Roe's theory correctly captures the American experience, then, but
for the legal restrictions, American corporations would be owned by fi-
nancial intermediaries controlling large pools of capital. If America's cor-
porations would be widely held in any event, then the financial restrictions
were not responsible. Thus, a prediction that one could infer from Roe's
theory is that, in countries with a liberal legal attitude toward investment
by financial intermediaries, ownership structure is more likely to be con-
centrated.
In Canada, the rules governing investment in corporate equity by banks
have in fact been liberal. The first piece of general banking legislation in
Canada contained no quantity restrictions on the holding of shares by
banks but did provide that banks could not "either directly or indirectly
. . . engage in any trade whatever . . . except in such trade generally as
pertains to the business of banking."8 While such a provision certainly
could have been interpreted to limit the ability of banks to invest in corpo-
rate equity, courts have taken a liberal approach in interpreting the bounds
8. Bank Act, S.c., 1871, chap. 5, sec. 40. A similar limitation exists today: see S.c., chap.
46, sec. 409.
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of "the business of banking." In White et al. v. Bank of Toronto et al., for
example, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that there was nothing in the
Bank Act
to suggest that a bank may not "deal in" the stock of its corporate
debtor just as freely as it might deal in the stock of a corporation not
its debtor or, for that matter in the bonds of the Dominion of Can-
ada.... The conduct of modern business inevitably leads to an infinite
variety of situations not the least complicated of which may occur in
the carrying on in this country "of such business generally as appertains
to the business of banking" and it seems to me that this has been recog-
nized throughout the numerous decennial revisions of the Bank Act by
the use of broad and general terms in describing what a bank may do.9
At the very least, banks were permitted to invest in corporations of which
they were creditors, ostensibly in order to protect their investment in the
debt rather than to make a profit on the security itself (Baxter 1968, 198).
It was not unti11967 that quantitative restrictions on banks' equity invest-
ments were implemented. lO
Thus, Canada was a country that did not place significant limitations
on the ability of its banks to invest in Canadian equity. If Roe is right
that such legal limitations contributed to widely held corporate ownership
structures in the United States, then perhaps the absence of such limita-
tions in Canada would have invited bank investment and more concen-
trated ownership.
Canada certainly does have more concentrated ownership, but, histor-
ically, banks' equity investments have not been significant. The level of
securities held by Canadian banks as a percentage of total assets was
around 7 percent in 1926, 7 percent in 1935, 5 percent in 1955, 5 percent
in 1965, and 6.0 percent in 1980 (Daniels and Halpern 1996, 34).11 In
the 1990s, this level has not exceeded 1.5 percent (MacIntosh 1996, 181).
Various explanations have been offered for this low level of investment
by banks. Neufeld (1972, 113) claims that the disinterest in equity arose
because of the need for large-scale government financing during the wars
and the depression and because of losses suffered by the banks from fi-
nancing railways. Jamieson (1953, 134-37) concludes that concern for sta-
bility and liquidity led banks to invest in government debt rather than cor-
porate equity. Niosi (1982, chap. 1) claims that the inculcation of British
financial practices in Canadian bankers led Canadian banks to place a pre-
mium on traditional debt financing rather than equity investment.
9. White et al. v. Bank of Toronto et al., [1953] 3 D.L.R. 118 (Ont. c.A.), 125.
10. A change that followed the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Banking
and Finance (1964).
II. As indicators of banks' investment in corporate equity, these figures are biased upward,
given that they do not discriminate between corporate equities and other types of securities,
such as municipal securities and corporate bonds and debentures.
Causes and Consequences of Ownership Concentration in Canada 87
For whatever reason, Canadian banks did not invest significantly in cor-
porate equity. This observation may cast doubt on Roe's explanation of
the American experience: in Canada, in any event, the absence of legal
restrictions in the United States may not have had the binding effect that
Roe ascribes to them. More germane to the present analysis, the legal
differences between the United States and Canada with respect to rules
governing banks' investments do not appear to have contributed to the
concentration of ownership in Canada since banks were not the source of
capital that allowed firms to grow while maintaining concentrated owner-
ship structures.
A similar conclusion applies with respect to equity investment by insur-
ance companies. In 1868, federal law treated investment by insurance com-
panies as a matter to be set out in the companies' corporate charters, 12
and, in 1899, the statute was amended to permit all life insurance compa-
nies to invest in securities. In 1910, the Insurance Act limited equity invest-
ment to a maximum of 30 percent of any single firm~and then only if
the firm met a seven-year dividend test of at least 4 percent. 13 Following
the market crash of 1929, restrictions were tightened, limiting equity in-
vestment to 15 percent of total investments (Royal Commission on Bank-
ing and Finance 1964, 249). In 1965, the restrictions were relaxed again,
and the limit became 25 percent of total investments. 14
While the legal restrictions have varied over time, observers suggest that
they were rarely binding, at least during the postwar period. Insurance
companies had suffered significant losses during the depression and were
also concerned about meeting regulatory liquidity standards (Hood and
Main 1956, 478). Total industry investment in equity stood at about 3
percent of the value of the portfolio in 1964, and this did not change sig-
nificantly with the introduction of the 25 percent rule in 1965, investment
rising only to 5 percent by 1968. In more recent times, this percentage has
remained well below the legal limit, at around 10 percent in the 1980s
and up to 1991, although jumping to 19.7 percent in 1992 (MacIntosh
1996, 182).
While the experience with insurance investment has been more ambigu-
ous than that with bank investment, it supports the conclusion that, over
the years, "the traditional picture of Canadian finance, one of abstention
[by Canadian financial intermediaries] from the founding, reorganization
and control of non-financial corporations, has remained unchanged" (Ni-
osi 1982, 63). The cause of concentrated ownership in Canada is unlikely
to be found in the legal regime governing the investment portfolios of
financial intermediaries.
12. An Act Respecting Insurance Companies, S.c. 1868, chap. 48.
13. Insurance Act, 1910, R.S.C., chap. 32, sec. 59.
14. An Act to Amend Certain Acts Administered in the Department of Insurance, S.c.
1964-65, chap. 40, sec. 5(9).
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3.2.2 Banking Regulations
Canadian banks faced regulations that differed from those faced by
American banks in other ways that may have contributed to a lower cost
of debt for Canadian corporations and therefore allowed firm growth to
rely more on debt than equity financing. There are at least two relevant
differences in Canadian banking regulations. First, entry into banking in
Canada is difficult. Under the Bank Act, only eight "Schedule I" banks are
presently permitted to carryon business as full-service banks. IS Second,
Canadian banks are permitted to carryon business throughout Canada,
without regard to provincial boundaries. 16 These rules imply that Cana-
dian banks are large relative to the economy. In 1984, for example, there
were 7,547 bank branches in Canada, with the 5 largest banks having over
1,000 branches each (Shearer, Chant, and Bond 1984,225). In contrast, in
the United States, there were 15,000 separate banks with a total of 39,000
branches, or an average of 2.6 branches per bank (Shearer, Chant, and
Bond 1984, 225).
It may be that the structure of Canadian banking that resulted from
these rules led to efficiencies in providing debt financing (Daniels and
Halpern 1996). Canadian banks faced economies in monitoring that
American banks, fettered by such restrictions on growth as limitations on
interstate banking, did not realize. The large absolute size of Canadian
banks permitted the spreading of the fixed costs of monitoring over a
larger number of transactions. Moreover, the small number of banks in
Canada enhanced the information supply among banks there, lowering
screening and monitoring costs. On top of these economies relative to
American banking, the law in Canada permitted greater bank input in the
affairs of a borrower in financial distress. For example, Canadian courts
have yet to embrace the doctrine of equitable subordination,17 which al-
lows courts to subordinate a lender's claims if the lender uses its control
over the borrower to obtain an advantage at the expense of other credi-
tors. 18 Given the lower costs to Canadian banks resulting from these dif-
ferences, it may be that firm growth in the Canadian economy was permit-
ted through debt financing to a greater extent than it was in the United
States, a consequence of which was the maintenance of high-equity owner-
ship concentration.
Cutting against the banking efficiency explanation of ownership con-
15. Bank Act (n. 3 above), sec. 14.
16. Ibid., sec. 15.
17. In Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 558,
the Supreme Court of Canada expressly declined to consider whether the doctrine of equi-
table subordination exists in Canada.
18. For example, In re American Lumber Co. v. Bergquist,S Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980)
(equitable subordination applied to creditor who received new security interests in inventory
and equipment from distressed borrower).
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centration in Canada is the possibility that the same regulations that led
to large banks in absolute and relative terms, and thus lower costs, may
also have led to market power. With such high barriers to entry and so
few significant Canadian banks, it may have been that, even if debt was
less costly to the banks, an absence of competition prevented prices on
debt to firms from being below those prevailing in the United States.
If it is true that efficiencies in Canadian banking relative to banking in
the United States led to a lower cost of debt to firms and thus contributed
to the concentration of ownership there, then Canadian firms would histor-
ically have had a higher debt-to-equity ratio than their American counter-
parts. We do not have any definitive empirical evidence that would allow
us to answer this question. 19
3.2.3 Protectionism
Historically, Canada has erected barriers to the free movement of goods
and capital across its borders. Both these types of barriers may have con-
tributed to the concentration of Canadian ownership.
A particularly relevant capital restriction penalized Canadian invest-
ment portfolios that had over 10 percent of their value in foreign assets. 20
Such a restriction may have given Canadian issuers market power21 that
allowed them to finance growth without relinquishing control (Daniels
and Halpern 1996). For example, in the absence of market power, it may
be that the sale of minority equity under a concentrated ownership struc-
ture that allows significant transfers of wealth from minority sharehold-
ers to the controller will fail to raise sufficient capital for a liquidity-
constrained entrepreneur to finance a particular investment. On the other
hand, in the presence of market power, investors may accept the lower
returns associated with entrenchment, and sufficient funds will be avail-
able despite the risk of transfers. While we cannot explain why firms would
prefer to take a discount on the shares from adopting an inefficient owner-
ship structure, if the firms chose to do so, some degree of market power
may have allowed liquidity-constrained firms to raise sufficient capital for
a particular project despite an inefficient structure. Perhaps as evidence of
this phenomenon, firms in Canada have often adopted dual class share
structures, which, by concentrating control in a small minority of shares,
are known to have significant potential for agency problems between the
controlling shareholders and the noncontrolling shareholders.22
19. Preliminary work in comparative international capital structures does not reveal sig-
nificant differences in firm leverage across the G7 (Rajan and Zingales 1994).
20. There were tax consequences with respect to retirement savings if a portfolio had over
10 percent of its assets in foreign investments (An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, S.c.
1970-71-72, chap. 63, sec. 206). Since 1991, the threshold is 20 percent.
21. That is, the ability to earn supracompetitive returns when issuing equity.
22. As of December 1987, companies listing restricted shares constituted 15 percent of
the total number of companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) (Amoako-Adu,
Smith, and Schnabel 1990, 39).
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Canada has also historically imposed significant trade barriers. These
may have had several effects on industry conducive to concentrated own-
ership. First, tariffs may have helped keep firms small given the relatively
small size of the Canadian economy and the restriction of international
trade (Harris 1984; Eastman and Stykolt 1967). As Demsetz and Lehn
(1985) point out, the smaller a firm is, the lower the cost of a control block
and thus the greater the likelihood of concentrated ownership. Thus, by
fostering small firms, tariffs may have contributed to concentrated own-
ership.
Second, to circumvent the high tariffs on trade with Canada, foreign
firms often established partially owned subsidiaries in Canada. Rather
than owning these firms outright, which would have led to private compa-
nies, not to concentrated ownership structures in the sense of controlling
and minority shareholders, the foreign firms had tax incentives to sell part
of their equity to Canadians. For example, in the 1963 budget, withholding
taxes on dividends were lower if Canadians owned at least 25 percent of
the voting shares of a company (Daniels and Halpern 1996, 42). These
incentives, along with the tariff barriers, may have contributed to the con-
centrated nature of Canadian corporate ownership.
A third reason why trade barriers may have led to increased concentra-
tion relates to market power. By limiting foreign competition, tariff barri-
ers discouraged the development of competitive markets in Canada (Har-
ris 1984; Eastman and Stykolt 1967). We argue in more detail in the next
section that market power may contribute to concentrated ownership.
3.2.4 Market Power
There are two significant ways in which Canadian law has fostered the
growth of market power23 in its economy. First, Canada has historically
been protectionist. The National Policy of 1879 established high tariffs
and thus significant barriers to entry into the Canadian market for foreign
producers, and tariffs since then have continued to protect Canadian firms
from foreign competition (Harris 1984; Eastman and Stykolt 1967). Obvi-
ously, the 1989 Free Trade Agreement with the United States and succes-
sor agreements considerably opened trade and the likelihood of compe-
tition. Second, while a competition policy regime has been in place since
1889, the regime was virtually ineffective until the Competition Act of
1986.
The possible connections between market power and concentrated own-
ership are complex. Rather than viewing market power as a cause of con-
centrated ownership, a possibility that we discuss shortly, Morck has sug-
gested that concentrated corporate ownership may lead to market power
because of political rent seeking (Morck 1996). If the benefits exceed the
23. That is, the ability of firms to earn supracompetitive returns in their product markets.
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costs, firms will lobby politicians to erect barriers to entry and other im-
pediments to competition in order to increase their market power. Morck
provides two reasons why firms with concentrated ownership are lower-
cost rent seekers and, therefore, why they are more likely to have market
power. First, more narrowly held firms may be able to operate in greater
secrecy than their widely held counterparts. Second, the managers of nar-
rowly held firms may be less likely to be terminated and therefore better
able to repay politicians or bureaucrats in exchange for the erection of
impediments to competition.
We are skeptical of Morck's claims.24 Secrecy mayor may not be impor-
tant to rent seeking. For example, a corporation may wish to establish a
reputation of reliably returning favors. On the other hand, a politician
may want secrecy in order to preserve a reputation of integrity, but this
will not always be true. For instance, a politician may wish to take public
credit if the corporation promises to build a factory in her jurisdiction in
exchange for an entry barrier. Even if secrecy is important, however, it is
unclear how significant an advantage concentrated public firms have in
this regard. Disclosure rules, such as in the case of campaign contribu-
tions, will publicize both a concentrated and a widely held firm's rent-
seeking efforts equally. To the extent that public disclosure is not required,
there may be a secrecy benefit for privately held firms that do not have to
hold public meetings or issue annual reports, but it may not be signifi-
cantly easier to keep secrets as ownership concentration increases in pub-
lic corporations.
With respect to Morck's second point, it is not clear that managers of
more narrowly held firms are more secure in their positions. Where the
controlling shareholder and managers are different people, it may be that
management has less security of tenure than at a widely held firm. Ratio-
nal apathy on the part of shareholders may protect managers at a widely
held firm from termination, while managers subject to intense monitoring
by a controlling shareholder do not have such protection.
In any event, even if the threat of termination shortens significantly the
widely held firm's horizons for rent seeking, it is unclear whether politi-
cians and bureaucrats, who are subject to the whims of the political pro-
cess, have particularly long horizons themselves. It strikes us as plausible
to assume that rent-seeking deals are struck with a view to forthright con-
summation.
In our view, there may be a difference with respect to the benefits of
rent seeking that establish ownership concentration as a potential cause
of market power. As outlined above, control blocks of equity may give
24. We do, however, accept Morek's premise that rent seeking is an important determinant
of market outcomes. For a thoughtful expression of reservations about the importance of
rent seeking in practice in recent years, see Trebilcock (1999).
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their owners the opportunity to realize a disproportionate share of the
firm's profits. The controller will undertake an investment if the private
benefits to it exceed the total costs, costs that are shared by both the con-
troller and the minority shareholders. If the controller has an interest in
activities outside the firm (such as ownership stakes in other firms) that
could benefit from a particular form of rent seeking, it may use the firm's
resources to invest in this rent seeking even if the total private benefits of
the rent seeking are less than the total costs. The controller's interests out-
side the firm imply that it realizes a disproportionate share of the private
benefits of rent seeking, while the costs are shared with the firm's share-
holders.
Thus, as compared to a shareholder who has significant holdings but
who is not entrenched, an entrenched controlling shareholder may invest
more in rent seeking; rent seeking itself is an agency problem between
the minority and the controller. Because of this agency behavior by the
controlling shareholder, concentrated ownership may give rise to market
power.
While ownership concentration may have an effect on market power,
there is also a possibility that market power may have an effect on owner-
ship concentration. The simple reason for this is that, as market power
and the future profits from an enterprise rise, a lower degree of outside
financing is required. In what follows, we assume, following Myers and
Majluf (1984), that there is asymmetric information between a firm's in-
siders and outside investors. There is some information that is difficult
to convey to the market, such as the ability of management, and there is an
adverse selection problem about unobservable information: outsiders dis-
count the likely prospects of the firm.
With market power and higher profits, firms may be able to finance
future investment out of retained earnings. Because of asymmetric infor-
mation between insiders and outside investors, such retained earnings may
entail a lower cost of capital and thus may be the capital source of choice
(Myers and Majluf 1984). Profitable firms-firms with market power-
are better able to finance investment without selling equity. Hence, firms
with market power are more likely to retain a concentrated ownership
structure than competitive firms given that the former do not have to use
outside financing to the same extent. Another reason why firms with mar-
ket power may have more concentrated ownership is that a firm with pros-
pects for significant profits is able to raise a given amount of capital selling
a relatively low percentage of its total shares when it does go to equity
markets. If an asymmetric information problem exists, therefore, market
power and higher profits are likely to be correlated with a greater degree
of ownership concentration.25
25. In his comment on our paper, George Triantis rightly points out that, by treating the
cash available to the corporation as a function of market power, we do not account for the
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To summarize, market power, ownership concentration, and the law are
related in the following ways. Ownership concentration may encourage
rent seeking, which may result in laws encouraging market power, such as
tariffs. Laws that encourage market power by definition give rise to market
power, which in turn may give rise to ownership concentration by allowing
firms to minimize outside financing. These effects are reinforcing, solidify-
ing the relation between ownership concentration, market power, and the
law.26
3.2.5 Rigidity in Ownership Structure and the Equal Opportunity Rule
There may be rigidity in a concentrated ownership structure that height-
ens concern about inefficiently concentrated ownership structures. Even if
it is efficient to evolve to a less concentrated ownership structure and the
parties know that it is efficient to do so, once in place, an inefficiently con-
centrated ownership structure may be difficult to change. The law in Can-
ada may exacerbate the problem by adherence to an "equal opportunity
rule." We first explain the rigidity phenomenon and then review the legal
problem.
By definition, there would be gains from lowering the concentration of
an inefficiently concentrated firm: agency costs would be lower. However,
even assuming now that there is no asymmetric information between the
firm and outsiders (as in the previous section), the following factors may
conspire to prevent the realization of those gains. First, the controlling
shareholder realizes a disproportionate return to its shares as a result
of agency behaviorY Second, minority shareholders and the controlling
shareholder could collectively benefit from deconcentration and need each
other to accomplish those gains; thus, the surplus from lowering agency
costs will likely be shared between the controlling shareholder and the
minority shareholders. Given these two factors, the controlling share-
holder will require compensation for the private losses to it from forgone
control benefits and will also likely require a share of the surplus created
prospect that cash flow itself may cause agency problems and lower profits. This is analyti-
cally similar to the problem we do address: concentrated ownership may itself cause agency
problems. While reducing concentrated ownership through equity sales and reducing free
cash flow through debt issuance may both reduce agency problems, asymmetric information
may deter such sales in either case-the information discount may dominate the losses from
agency costs.
26. There is evidence from Canada that is at least not inconsistent with the conjecture that
competition-promoting policies wi11lower the concentration of ownership. While competi-
tion policy has existed in Canada for over a century, it was largely ineffective until the passage
of the Competition Act in 1986. Moreover, in 1989, Canada entered into the Free Trade
Agreement with the United States. Defining widely held firms as those with a float percent-
age above 90 percent, we find that the number of widely held firms on the TSE 300 has indeed
risen since these competition-promoting developments. In December 1988, 29.0 percent of
firms on the TSE 300 were widely held; in December 1997, 65.7 percent of firms were
widely held.
27. Since the agency behavior is inefficient, however, the control benefits to the majority
are smaller than the costs of these benefits to the minority.
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by the deconcentration (the surplus being the recovered deadweight
losses). If they could act as a collective unit, the minority shareholders
could compensate the controller and still profit since the gains from de-
concentration exceed the losses. However, there will likely be a significant
collective action problem.
If concentration is excessive, deconcentration is a public good: all mi-
nority shareholders benefit from lower agency costs. Given this factor and
the controlling shareholder's demand for a share of the surplus as well as
compensation for lost control benefits, a minority shareholder is best off
when it does not buy any of the controller's shares but the other minority
shareholders collectively act to purchase some of the controller's shares.
Since each minority shareholder is best off when the others act to purchase
the shares, the purchase may not occur even though it is efficient. Once
established, a concentrated ownership structure may be difficult to change
even though it is efficient to do so and the parties know that it is efficient
to do SO.28
The law in Canada, exemplified by the law in Ontario, may compound
the rigidity problem in the following respects. Section 1 of the Ontario
Securities Act provides that the sale of any shares by a shareholder with
sufficient holdings materially to affect control of the corporation, or, in
any event, holding 20 percent or more of the voting securities of the corpo-
ration, is defined to be a "distribution:' Under part 15 of the Ontario
Securities Act, any trade that is a distribution must be accompanied by a
prospectus. The sale of part of a control block in order to bring about
lower concentration of ownership may be in part discouraged by the trans-
actions costs that are particular only to control-block transactions.
Another potential legal impediment to efficient deconcentration is that
Ontario courts and statutes have frowned on the payment of a premium
to controlling shareholders when they sell part of their control blocks. In
Re CTC Dealer Holdings Ltd. and Ontario Securities Commission, a cor-
poration had a dual class share structure: there were about 3.5 million com-
mon shares with voting rights and about 80 million outstanding "class N'
shares that did not have voting rights. 29 There was a "coattail" provision
28. The collective action problem described here is similar to that described by Grossman
and Hart (1980) in the takeover context: shareholders subject to a takeover bid are best off
if other shareholders tender into the bid. The problem of compensation for control benefits
impeding efficient deconcentration is similar to Bebchuk's (1994) analysis of inefficiencies in
the sale of corporate control. Bebchuk points out that an efficient sale of control may not
take place if the potential buyer is unable to compensate the target's current owner for the
lost benefits of private control; even a buyer that could increase the value of the firm may
not buy it. The problem that we point out assumes that the buyer of part of control, the
minority shareholders, could, acting collectively, compensate the controller for the lost bene-
fits of private control and still profit from the increased value of the firm, but a collective
action problem prevents them from doing so.
29. Re CTC Dealer Holdings Ltd. and Ontario Securities Commission, [1987] 37 D.L.R.
(4th) 94 (Ont. H. Ct.).
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in the corporation's articles that provided that, if a majority of the com-
mon shares were tendered into a takeover bid, the class A shares would
convert to voting shares. A prospective buyer of control offered to buy 49
percent of the common shares from three members of the Billes family at
a considerable premium relative to the stock market price, thus gaining
effective control without triggering the coattail provision. The Ontario
Securities Commission set aside the transaction on the grounds of public
policy, holding that the deliberate attempt to sidestep the coattail was
"grossly abusive" of the class A securityholders and of the equity market
in general.
While this case clearly involved matters beyond the question of the legit-
imacy of a control premium, the commission and, in approving the com-
mission's decision, the Ontario Court of Justice both viewed negatively the
incumbent controlling shareholders' desire to realize the control premium
themselves without sharing it with the class A shareholders. Justice Reid
referred to the Billes family's clear wish to horde the control premium for
itself as evidence supporting the commission's finding of an abuse. 3D In
that case, the court clearly viewed a premium to controlling shareholders
alone as unfair.
By adhering to the equal opportunity rule, Ontario statutes also dis-
courage the payment of premia to controlling shareholders. If a purchaser
will own 20 percent of the shares of a particular class after the transaction
is completed, the transaction is a takeover bid under section 89 of Ontario
Securities Act. Pursuant to section 97, a takeover bid must offer the same
consideration to all shareholders in the same class. A large shareholder
contemplating the purchase of shares from the majority cannot single out
the majority for its offer but rather must extend it to all shar~holders in
the relevant class. Obviously, the payment of a premium to the controlling
30. Justice Reid stated for the court (ibid., 109):
The Commission made it clear that the abuse it perceived was of two kinds: abuse of
the Class A shareholders and of the marketplace itself. There was much evidence before
it to support its conclusion that the offer was an abuse of the Class A shareholders....
The Commission was concerned that the Billeses had participated in the offer in order to
serve their sole object, i.e., to get the maximum amount possible for their control position,
and wholly ignored the interests of the Class A shareholders....
[T]he Commission heard evidence from Fred, the son of one of the founders, that nei-
ther he nor his brother or sister were concerned over the Class As being left out of the
enormous premium they were to receive under the offer. The following evidence was con-
sidered important enough for the Commission to repeat it in its reasons at p. 82 ... :
Q. Am I correct in assuming that you, David and Martha wanted to maximize the
control proceeds which you realized, if you were going to sell your shares of Cana-
dian Tire.
A. I believe that is correct.
Q. Your concern for the well-being of the holders of the A shares did not extend to
permitting them to participate in the control premium?
A. That's correct.
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shareholder alone is deterred by such a rule. Such deterrence under the
takeover rules may be particularly problematic given that a shareholder
most likely to be willing to pay a premium and compensate the controlling
shareholder for lost control benefits is one with significant shareholdings.
Only with significant shareholdings are the benefits of lower agency costs
sufficiently realized by an individual purchaser such that it may be pri-
vately profitable to purchase part of the control block in order to reduce
agency costS. 31 The equal opportunity rule may prevent payment of a pre-
mium by those shareholders most likely to overcome the free-rider prob-
lem in moving to a more efficient, less concentrated ownership structure.
The equal opportunity rule also applies to corporate buybacks where
the firm purchases some of its own outstanding equity. Such a buyback
could address the rigidity problem. If the firm itself purchases some of
the controlling shareholders' equity, the collective action problem may be
overcome. The firm acts as a representative of all shareholders, and the
costs and benefits of the share purchase are thus shared on a pro rata
basis. It will, however, remain the case that the controlling shareholder
will demand a premium for its shares in order both to be compensated for
lost control benefits and to share in the surplus from efficient deconcentra-
tion. The law in Ontario prevents such a premium.
According to section 89 of the Ontario Securities Act, any offer by an
issuer of securities to redeem or acquire any or all of the outstanding
shares of that issuer is an "issuer bid:' An issuer bid is subject to many of
the same rules as takeover bids, including the equal opportunity rule. Un-
der section 97, the same consideration must be offered to all members of
a class in an issuer bid. This effectively eliminates the possibility of reliance
on a buyback to overcome the rigidity problem. The controller will de-
mand a premium, yet the equal opportunity rule prevents an idiosyncratic
premium. Given that the premium cannot be offered profitably to the class
as a whole, the equal opportunity rule may deter efficient deconcentration
through a buyback.
There are two circumstances in which the free-rider problem inherent
in paying the controlling shareholder a premium may be overcome and
therefore efficient deconcentration may occur: where there is a large mi-
nority shareholder and where there is a buyback. The equal opportunity
rule prevents the payment of a premium to the controlling shareholder in
precisely these circumstances. Thus, the rule may deter deconcentration
even if it is efficient to move to a less concentrated ownership structure.
The existence of this rule in Canada, but not in the United States, may
perhaps contribute to the concentrated ownership structures in Canada,
31. Just as toehold stakes held by the raider in the takeover context may overcome the
Grossman and Hart (1980) free-rider problem.
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although we have no specific empirical evidence supporting or rejecting
this hypothesis. 32
3.3 Normative Implications
The various possible causal links between the law and ownership con-
centration have different normative implications. As discussed, there is
no theoretically optimal corporate ownership structure. Widely held firms
may face agency costs because of rogue managers, while more narrowly
held firms may face agency costs because of rogue controlling sharehold-
ers. The following discussion remains neutral on the question of the opti-
mal structure but does assess other normative implications of the relations
between various laws and ownership structure.
Whether the rules governing financial intermediaries have affected own-
ership concentration levels in Canada is, as discussed, unclear. Financial
intermediaries appear not to have invested in Canadian equity despite per-
missive regulations. In any event, even supposing that the legal regulation
had an effect on ownership structure by permitting significant investment
by financial intermediaries, this cause itself does not add anything to the
question of the social desirability of the regulations. The question is simply
whether concentrated ownership is desirable relative to widely held firms:
if so, then the regulations were desirable in this respect; if not, then they
were not desirable in this respect. We have no opinion on this matter.
The second causal factor discussed above argues in favor of the regula-
tions in question. If a regulatory environment fostering large banks helped
reduce the cost of debt to both banks and corporations in Canada, which
led in turn to greater ownership concentration, then ownership concentra-
tion could perhaps be viewed as evidence of the efficiency of the Canadian
banking system, at least relative to that in the United States. Whether
ownership concentration was a desirable result in itself is a separate ques-
tion; as a causal explanation of ownership concentration, however, the
regulations may demonstrate their efficiency-enhancing properties. 33
To the extent that they were a cause of ownership concentration, protec-
tionist policies with respect to trade and capital flows may have served to
distort the form of Canadian corporations away from the optimum. For
example, tax incentives may have induced foreign corporations to estab-
32. Our analysis is based on rigidity of concentrated ownership structures once estab-
lished. Bebchuk and Zingales (chap. 2 in this volume) show that the equal opportunity rule
may encourage the establishment of a concentrated ownership structure as opposed to a
private firm.
33. We do not have an opinion, however, about one aspect of the regulatory regime dis-
cussed: the doctrine of equitable subordination. While it contributes to a lower cost of debt,
it may raise the cost of equity to an inefficient level.
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lish potentially inefficient concentrated ownership structures for their Ca-
nadian subsidiaries rather than wholly owned subsidiaries. Moreover, the
subsidiaries themselves may have been established only to circumvent tar-
iffs. Such distortions argue against the protectionist regulatory regime that
spawned them.
We argued that a lax regulatory attitude with respect to competition
may have contributed to concentrated ownership in Canada and that con-
centrated ownership in Canada may have contributed to a lax regulatory
attitude with respect to competition. The latter possibility perhaps sug-
gests an additional reason for concern about concentrated ownership. The
welfare effects of the former possibility are as follows. In the absence of
asymmetric information, in establishing an ownership structure an entre-
preneur would choose a level of ownership concentration that maximizes
the value of the firm in order to maximize her private returns from the
sum of future profits and the proceeds from the sale of equity. That is, she
would choose a level of ownership that minimizes agency costs. If, how-
ever, there is asymmetric information such that outside investors discount
the value of the equity, she may avoid equity financing in order to avoid
her private losses associated with outsiders' discounting the equity. Asym-
metric information combined with product market power, which allows
the firm to raise a given amount of capital selling a smaller fraction of
equity, may give rise to a concentrated ownership structure that does not
minimize agency costs.
From a policy perspective, it is important to isolate the respective roles
played by market power and information asymmetry in excessive owner-
ship concentration. It is the asymmetry of information that leads the en-
trepreneur to minimize equity sales despite agency costs, while market
power simply accommodates concentrated ownership. While minimizing
asymmetric information problems, perhaps by establishing penalties for
false disclosure, is clearly desirable from a policy perspective, there is no
a priori reason to conclude that reducing market power will have a bene-
ficial effect on the choice of corporate ownership since it will focus the
entrepreneur's choice on choosing the ownership structure that maximizes
the value of the firm. 34 Again, it depends on the unanswered question of
the overall desirability of concentrated as opposed to atomistic ownership.
As a positive matter, however, we would predict that tougher competition
rules and liberalized trade would lead to a lower level of ownership con-
centration. 35
The final aspect of Canadian law that we considered that may contrib-
34. In Ontario, see the Ontario Securities Act, pt. 23.
35. As noted above, there is evidence from Canada that is at least not inconsistent with
the conjecture that competition-promoting policies williower the concentration of owner-
ship (see n. 26 above).
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ute to concentrated ownership was the equal opportunity rule. By perhaps
preventing efficient deconcentration ofownership, the rule may have harm-
ful effects. There are competing considerations,36 but our analysis here sug-
gests a reason for repeal.
If the rule were to be abolished, it is important to recognize its sources.
An equal opportunity rule is clearly established by the Ontario Securities
Act, but, apparently, it also has independent support in the courts, as evi-
denced by eTe Dealer Holdings. By finding that a control premium was
an abuse of noncontrolling shareholders, in eTe Dealer Holdings the
court established a precedent that may hurt minority shareholders by de-
terring efficient deconcentration.
3.4 Conclusion
The law may have contributed to Canada's corporate ownership struc-
ture in a variety of ways. Our theoretical analysis, which would require
empirical confirmation before any firm conclusions could be reached, sug-
gests that some of these contributions were likely socially beneficial (e.g.,
relatively liberal banking regulations), some were likely neutral with re-
spect to corporate ownership (e.g., liberal investment rules for financial
intermediaries), and others were undesirable (e.g., protectionism). While
there may be implications for specific laws to be culled from our analysis,
we do not offer any answers to the basic question of whether there is too
much concentrated ownership in Canada. For example, as a positive mat-
ter, we predict that, as market power in Canada declines because of in-
ternational competition and competition law, so, too, will ownership con-
centration. Whether, as a normative matter, this would be a desirable
development we cannot say.
References
Amoaku-Adu, B., B. Smith, and J. Schnabel. 1990. The risk of dual classes of
shares: Are there differences? Journal ofEconomics and Business 42:39-50.
Baxter, I. 1968. The law of banking and the Canadian Bank Act. 2d ed. Toronto:
Carswell.
Bebchuk, L. 1994. Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate control. Quarterly
Journal ofEconomics 109:957~94.
Berle, A., and G. Means. 1933. The modern corporation and private property. New
York: Macmillan.
36. For example, Bebchuk (1994) describes how the equal opportunity rule may in some
circumstances discourage inefficient sales of control, although it may also deter efficient sales
of control in other circumstances.
100 Ronald J. Daniels and Edward M. Iacobucci
Daniels, R., and P. Halpern. 1996. Too close for comfort: The role of the closely
held public corporation in the Canadian economy and the implications for pub-
lic policy. Canadian Business Law Journal 26: 11-62.
Daniels, R., and 1. MacIntosh. 1991. Toward a distinctive Canadian corporate law
regime. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 29:863-933.
Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. Managerial ownership of voting rights: Causes
and consequences. Journal ofPolitical Economy 93:1155-77.
Eastman, H., and S. Stykolt. 1967. The tariff and competition in Canada. To-
ronto: Macmillan.
Fama, E. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political
Economy 88:288-307.
Grossman, S., and O. Hart. 1980. Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the
theory of the corporation. Bell Journal ofEconomics 11 :42-69.
Harris, R. 1984. Trade, industrial policy, and Canadian manufacturing. Toronto:
Ontario Economic Council.
Hart, O. 1983. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell Journal of
Economics 14:366-82.
Holderness, c., and D. Sheehan. 1988. The role of majority shareholders in pub-
licly held corporations: An exploratory analysis. Journal of Financial Econom-
ics 20:317-47.
Hood, W M., and O. W Main. 1956. The role of Canadian life insurance compa-
nies in the post-war capital market. Canadian Journal ofEconomics and Political
Science 22:467-80.
Iacobucci, E., and M. Trebilcock. 1996. Value for money: Executive compensation
in the 1990s. Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute.
Jamieson, A. B. 1953. Chartered banking in Canada. Toronto: Ryerson.
Jensen, M., and W Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs, and capital structure. Journal ofFinancial Economics 3:305-60.
Jog, V, and A. Tulpule. 1996. Control and performance: Evidence from the TSE
300. In Corporate decision-making in Canada, ed. R. Daniels and R. Morck.
Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
MacIntosh, 1. 1996. Institutional shareholders and corporate governance in Can-
ada. Canadian Business Law Journal 26: 145-88.
MacIntosh, 1., and L. Schwartz. 1996. Do institutional and controlling sharehold-
ers increase corporate value? In Corporate decision-making in Canada, ed.
R. Daniels and R. Morck. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
Manne, H. 1965. Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal ofPolitical
Economy 73:110-20.
Morck, R. 1996. On the economics of concentrated ownership. Canadian Business
Law Journal 26:63-75.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market
valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal ofFinancial Economics 20:293-315.
Morck, R., and D. Stangeland. 1994. Corporate performance and large sharehold-
ers: An empirical analysis. In Issues in corporate control and the performance
of corporations, by D. Stangeland. Ph.D. diss., Faculty of Business, University
of Alberta.
Myers, S., and N. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions
when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial
Economics 13:157-226.
Neufeld, E. P. 1972. Thefinancial system of Canada. Toronto: Macmillan.
Niosi, 1. 1982. The economy of Canada: A study of ownership and control. 2d ed.
Montreal: Black Rose.
Performance 500, top 10. 1997. Canadian Business, June, 135-87.
Causes and Consequences of Ownership Concentration in Canada 101
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales. 1994. What do we know about capital structure? Some
evidence from international data. NBER Working Paper no. 4875. Cambridge,
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rao, P. S., and C. Lee-Sing. 1996. Governance structure, corporate decision-
making, and firm performance in North America. In Corporate decision-making
in Canada, ed. R. Daniels and R. Morek. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
Roe, M. 1991. A political theory of American corporate finance. Columbia Law
Review 91:10-67.
---.1994. Strong managers, weak owners: The political roots ofAmerican corpo-
rate finance. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Royal Commission on Banking and Finance. 1964. Report. Ottawa: Queen's
Printer.
Shearer, R., 1. Chant, and D. Bond. i984. The economics of the Canadian financial
system. 2d ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada.
Slovin, M., and M. Sushka. 1993. Ownership concentration, corporate control
activity, and firm value: Evidence from the death of inside blockholders. Journal
ofFinance 48:1293-1321.
Smith, A. 1937. Wealth ofnations. 1776 Cannan ed. New York: Modern Library.
Stulz, R. 1988. Managerial control of voting rights, financing policies, and the
market for corporate control. Journal ofFinancial Economics 20:25-54.
Trebilcock, M. 1999. Lurching around Chicago: The positive challenge of ex-
plaining the recent regulatory reform agenda. In Rationality in public policy:
Retrospect and prospect: A tribute to Douglas G Hartle, ed. R. Bird, M. Trebil-
cock, and T. Wilson. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation.
Triantis, G. 1996. Debt financing, corporate decision making, and security design.
Canadian Business Law Journal 26:93-105.
Triantis, G., and R. Daniels. 1995. The role of debt in interactive corporate gover-
nance. California Law Review 83:1073-1113.
Comment George G. Triantis
Ronald Daniels and Edward Iacobucci describe various ways in which the
concentrated ownership structures in Canada may be due to the organiza-
tion of Canadian industry. The focus of my comments is on two of their
claims: (l) Market concentration in many industries has produced higher
profits, thereby allowing firms to finance their activities with retained
earnings rather than external capital. (2) Concentration in the banking
sector has produced efficiencies in lending, thereby reducing the cost of
debt financing and enabling firms to finance by borrowing rather than
diluting equity interests.
These two claims relate to the means by which a firm can finance its
activities without issuing new stock: internal capital or debt finance. With
respect to the former, Daniels and Iacobucci suggest that many Canadian
firms enjoy market power that increases their retained earnings and hence
George G. Triantis is professor of law at the University of Chicago.
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their pool of internal capital. In a world of imperfect information, the
abundance of internal funds is a mixed blessing. It is efficient when the
ability of a firm to tap equity markets is impeded by information asym-
metry between its managers and investors (Myers and Majluf 1984).
However, internal capital also insulates managers from the scrutiny and
discipline of capital markets and enables them to appropriate free cash for
self-interested activities (e.g., Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). The deter-
mination of the optimal amount of internal capital depends on the firm's
opportunity set, and it can be implemented to some degree by manipulat-
ing capital structure (e.g., Triantis 2000).
Daniels and Iacobucci treat the availability of retained earnings as exog-
enous: the cash available to the firm is determined by its profitability,
which is a function of its market power. However, it ought to be viewed as
an endogenous variable in the choice of capital structure. The analysis
should consider that capital markets might entice or compel firms to com-
mit to paying out earnings by taking on debt or paying dividends and to
returning to capital markets for the funding of new projects. The issue
then becomes the conditions under which the entrepreneur or controlling
shareholder can internalize the efficiency gains from making such commit-
ments.
Daniels and Iacobucci suggest that Canadian banks have achieved
economies of scale and scope in screening, monitoring, and intervening
in the affairs of their borrowers. As a result, the cost of bank loans may
be lower in Canada than in the United States, encouraging firms to borrow
rather than issue new equity. The more leveraged a firm is, the more con-
centrated will be its ownership. The argument is sound, but it may miss a
more relevant point by focusing on concentration of stockholding rather
than of control. While stockholders enjoy voting rights and the ability to
enforce fiduciary duties, debtholders hold rights embedded in the cove-
nant, default, acceleration, and enforcement provisions of their contracts
with the firm. A breach of a covenant enables the debtholder to accelerate
the maturity of the debt and, if it is not paid in full, to remove assets
from the firm. Thus, the control rights of equity and debt vary in relative
significance with the prevailing financial condition of the firm. Specifi-
cally, the managers of a financially distressed firm tend to be more respon-
sive to the voice of their lenders than shareholders are. As a firm becomes
more leveraged, the likelihood of financial distress increases, as does, con-
sequently, the effective control of its lenders. Therefore, if it is true that
Canadian firms have more concentrated ownership structures because
they are more highly leveraged, this fact simply means that control rights
are more likely to be held by lenders rather than shareholders. Indeed,
the authors imply that, beyond the majority shareholders, control over
Canadian firms is exercised aggressively by a concentrated group of highly
skilled banks.
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